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This research aims to prove underpricing IPO differences between financial institution and non-financial institution
during 2001-2008 period. In addition, this research also examined the causes of underpricing IPO ’s of financial
institution and nonfinancial institution using asymmetric information hypothesis. This research uses initial return and
abnormal return as a measure to know which one is better as an underpricing measurement. Furthermore, the
calculation in this research is using the open to close prices data to have more accurate results and not biased.
The tests are using one sample t-test, independent t-test, and the ordinary least square regression to analyze the data.
One sample t-test is used to prove occurrence of institutions’s underpricing at observation period. Independent t-test is
used to determine differences significance in underpricing. Whereas, ordinary least square regression to determine
the causes of underpricing. Each test uses an initial return and abnormal return as a measure.
This research found that IPOs are significantly underpriced at the first day of trading. Financial institutions sector’s
IPOs are less underpriced than non-financial institutions sectors. This findings means that financial institution
sector have less asymmetric information than non-financial institution sectors. This study concludes that the
regulation and the monitoring for the financial institution sector have developed better than the previous few
years. In addition, there are several factors that affect underpricing. These factors are the type of business entities
and trade price volatility in the stock market. The usage of both initial return and abnormal return to measure
underpricing level are not significantly different. Furthermore, usage of open to close price data is able to give
more accurate results for calculations to measure underpricing level.
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I. Introduction
Growing firms have several options to fund their expansion of operational activities. One of the options in financing
enterprise operational processes is going public. Activities of firms that sell shares first time to public called the Initial
Public Offering (IPO). One of the important stages in the IPO process is determining underwriters who have a good
reputation (see Ruud, 1993; Alli et al, 1994; Ernyan and Husnan, 1997; Triaryati and Husnan, 2004).
IPO’s pricing process is often a difficult problem for both issuers and underwriters. On the one hand, the issuer
wants the highest pricing possible in order to maximize the funding needed for the expansion of operations.
Underwriters, who have more information about the condition of capital markets than the issuer, are tries to set a price
lower than fair price. By selling IPO’s at discount, underwriters can reduce the probability of unsold shares that force
them to buy residual stocks (Ruud, 1993; Triaryati and Husnan, 2004). Therefore, the underpricing phenomenon
2often seemed in the IPO.
This research aims to tell the difference underpricing that happen between regulated firms (financial institutions) and
non regulated firms. Underpricing differences between the financial institutions and non-financial institutions may
happen because of differences in information asymmetry in the financial institutions and non-financial institutions.
The study also aims to test several factors that affect underpricing of IPO’ s. These factors are type of institutions,
risk (standard deviation), underwriter reputation, and age of institution. We expect that these factors can explain
the underpricing of IPO’s.
Several previous studies are using the initial return (Alli et al, 1994; Ernyan and Husnan, 1997) and abnormal return
(Triaryati and Husnan; 2004) as a measure to determine the level of underpricing. This research will use both types
of measurements to know which measurements are better for explaining asymmetric information. We use open to
close price data for calculation to measure underpricing level. This is necessary in order to obtain research results that
are unbiased and more accurate. Previous studies using close to close price data as the reference calculation
underpricing. This can lead to bias result due to the closing price today are not always become the opening price
the next trading day. For investors who want to buy the securities by reference to the closing price the previous day,
may not be able to purchase that securities because of possible changes on the opening price the next day.
II. Literature Review
Generally, underpricing occurs when the IPO price is cheaper than prices in the secondary market on the first day of
trading, allowing investors to get an abnormal return. Ruud (1993) said “Over the past two decades, several empirical
studies have reported that initial public offerings sizeable achieve average returns over very short periods,
suggesting that the offerings may be underpriced”. Ross et al (2005:548) said that there are two facts found on
the underpricing puzzle. First, many of underpricing is concentrated in less offerings. Second, when the bid price
is too cheap, the demand of IPO is often oversubscribed. To identify the occurrence of IPO underpricing in
Indonesian Capital Market, the first hypothesis is that there is underpricing occurred on the first day of trading
after IPO. The first hypothesis would be divided to two minor hypotheses. Hypothesis 1a is that there is positive
average initial return on the first day of trading after IPO. While 1b hypothesis is that there is a positive average
abnormal return on the first day of trading after IPO.
Asymmetric information is the difference of information happened between the parties involved in the IPO, the
underwriters, business entities, and potential investors (Ernyan and Husnan, 1997). Underwriters have more complete
information about the market than the firms. Furthermore underwriters have more information about firms
rather than potential investors. As a result, there was a difference of information held by businesses on market
conditions, and potential investors about the condition of the firms. The greater the information asymmetry faced by
potential investors, the greater they penalized the price of primary market. This (penalty done by investors) will force
underwriters to offer these shares at a low price (underpriced).
Regulation hypothesis explains that government regulations are applied to reduce the asymmetric information
between the management with outsiders, including potential investors. So the underpricing of regulated firms will
be less than non-regulated firms. Alli et al (1994) find that underpricing is happening in the financial instituitions
are less than non-financial institutions. Thus, hypothesis two is underpricing of financial institutions will be
less than non-financial institutions. This hypothesis would be divided to two minor hypotheses. Hypothesis 2a is
the initial return on the financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions. Whereas hypothesis 2b is the
abnormal return on the financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions.
Ernyan and Husnan (1997) explained that proxy used to determine the ex-ante uncertainty is the volatility of stock
prices after trading in the stock. Volatility of stock prices can be measured by calculating the standard deviation of
initial returns and abnormal returns of stock prices. The greater the standard deviation, which is more volatile,
showed greater ex-ante uncertainty of the stock. From these explanations, we generate two hypotheses. Hypothesis 3
is the ex-ante uncertainty of the financial institutions will be less than non-financial institutions. Hypothesis 3
will be divided to two minor hypotheses. Hypothesis 3a is the standard deviation of initial return on financial
institutions is less than non-financial institutions. Hypothesis 3b is the standard deviation of abnormal return on
3financial institutions is less than non-financial institutions. The next hypothesis is hypothesis 4, the risk have a
positive effect on underpricing of IPO. Hypothesis 4 also will be divided to two minor hypotheses. Hypothesis 4a is
standard deviation has positive effect on initial return. Hypothesis 4b is, standard deviation has positive effect on
abnormal return. Furthermore, ex-ante uncertainty is also related to the reverse of gross proceed (prime stocks
capitalization). The less the values of reverse gross proceed will reduce investor speculation on the stock. So the
value of reverse gross proceed will goes to the opposite direction to the level of underpricing.
Maurer and Senbet (1992) in Triaryati and Husnan (2004) showed that the age of the firms has negative effect on
initial return. So, the older the firm establish, the lower underpricing level will be occurred. Hypothesis 5 is the age
of firms has negative effect on underpricing of IPO. Hypothesis 5 will be divided into two minor hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5a is age of the firms has negative effect the initial return on the IPO. Hypothesis 5b is age of the firms
has negative effect the abnormal return on the IPO.
Michaely and Shaw (1994) said that the better the reputation of underwriters, the lower the initial return occurs on
IPO. Related to this statement, Triaryati and Husnan (2004) explained that reputable underwriters will tend to
avoid risky IPO emission because it can threatening their reputation and sustainability. To measure reputation of the
underwriters, we use ratio of the market share of each underwriter who perform underwriting the IPO to the total
market share the underwriters as a proxy. Hypothesis 6 is the reputation of underwriters has negative effect on
underpricing of IPO. Hypothesis 6 will be divided to two minor hypotheses. Hypothesis 6a is underwriter market share
has a negative effect on the initial return. Hypothesis 6b is the underwriter market share has negative effect on the
abnormal return.
III. Research Method and Data
This study uses data obtained from financial laboratory databases FBE-UBAYA, yahoo finance website, IDX
website, and IMQ Antara website. These sources provide all of IPOs that made from 2001-2008 period, date of the
IPO, date of the firm established, industries and sub-industries, main underwriters for each IPO, number of shares
offered, opening and closing price for 20 days trading after the IPO, value of the opening and closing Composite







Year Σ IPO % Σ IPO % Σ IPO % Σ IPO %
2001 2 14.29 2 13.33 4 13.79 15 18.99
2002 3 21.43 3 20.00 6 20.69 11 13.92
2003 2 14.29 1 6.67 3 10.34 2 2.53
2004 0 0.00 4 26.67 4 13.79 8 10.13
2005 0 0.00 4 26.67 4 13.79 3 3.80
2006 3 21.43 0 0.00 3 10.34 8 10.13
2007 3 21.43 0 0.00 3 10.34 18 22.78
2008 1 7.14 1 6.67 2 6.90 14 17.72
Total 14 100.00 15 100.00 29 100.00 79 100.00
Sources: Indonesian Stock Exchange and Financial Laboratory Database FBE UBAYA
We use initial return and abnormal return as a measurement to indicate level of underpricing. Initial return is the return
obtained from the time purchased in the primary market to be listed first in the secondary market (Jogiyanto,
2008:33). To avoid bias due to the influence of divider’s magnitude, we use the following formula,
Whereas,
IR = initial return stock i period t
4Pi, 1 = close price of stock i at the first day
Pi, IPO = stock i price at the IPO
The analysis computed by using the stock's first day closing price and the average stock price during the first day
until the 20th day of trading. The calculation is expressed as,
Whereas,
Ri, t = return of i stock t period
Pi, t-open = stock price on the opening day i to t Pi, t-close = stock price at the
close on day i to t
To calculate the average daily return using the formula,
Whereas,
Rt = average return
R = return of i stock t period
n = number of shares that observed
Another measurement we use for this study is abnormal return. Jogiyanto (2008:549) said that abnormal return or
excess return is the excess of the return that really happened to normal return. Normal return in this case, is expected
return (return expected by investors). This research will use market-adjusted model for measuring the
undepricing of IPO. We use this model because there is no historical data on existing stocks. By using market-
adjusted model, the abnormal return formula becomes,
Whereas,
AR = abnormal return i stock t period
Ri, t = return of i stock t period
km, t = market return t period
km, t calculated from the composite index value adjusted with the first trading until 20th day for each share.
The analysis computed for 20 trading days, because it uses open to close price data, the calculation of return on the
following days expressed as,
Whereas,
Ri, t = return of i stock t period
Pi, t-open = open price of i stock on t day Pi, t-close = close price of i
stock on t day
5To calculate the values km, t we use the formula,
Whereas,
km, t = the period t market return
IHSGt-open = Open Indonesian composite index value on t day
IHSGt-close = Close Indonesian composite index value on t day
Thus, the average daily return on t day is,
Whereas,
Rt = average return
AR = abnormal return i stock t period
n = number of shares observed
The calculation of initial returns and abnormal returns will be done for the first 20 trading days in the secondary
market. Furthermore, the t test will be done with one sample method to test hypotheses 1a and 1b. The testing of
hypotheses 2a and 2b will be done in two ways. First we see the significance of t test results with one sample method.
Second, testing of hypotheses 2a and 2b will use independent sample t test method to determine the level of
significance from differences in initial return and abnormal return.
We use independent sample t test to test hypothesis 3. The test is using standard deviation as a proxy from initial
return and abnormal return. In addition, we will also test the reverse gross proceed, and the age of the firms. We
expect to know the risk differences between the financial sector enterprises and non-financial sector by
identifying level of significances. Furthermore, we use linear regression test to determine the effect of factors that
mentioned above to the underpricing. Regression test will be divided into two kinds. First regression test is using
the initial return as dependent variable (hypothesis 4a, 5a, and 6a). Whereas, the second regression test is
using abnormal return as dependent variable (hypothesis 4b, 5b, and 6b). Before doing a regression tests, first we
will running classical assumption test to ensure there are no statistical disturbances during the test progress. These tests
are including normality test, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.
IV. Result
Table 2 shows initial return and significance t level of each group. The values of initial return for financial
institutions are less than non-financial institutions during the first 20 trading days in IDX.
The results of one sample t test indicate that underpricing occurs in almost all sectors that going public on IDX
during 2001-2008 periods. These results support the hypothesis 1a which is said that there is an initial average
positive return on the first day of trading on the stock exchange. During this period, underpricing occurred in financial
institutions are less than non-financial institutions. These results are consistent with previous findings by Alli et al
(1994) who found that the initial return of financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions on the first
day of trading. Although the research is consistent with Alli et al (1994), these results are not consistent with
research of Ernyan and Husnan (1997) who found that the initial return on the financial institutions are greater than the
non-financial institutions. This result is also not consistent with the research Triaryati and Husnan (2004) who found
that the abnormal return on the financial institutions is greater than the non-financial institutions.
6This inconsistent result from previous research on capital markets in Indonesia indicates that there is a significant
progress in financial sector supervision so as to reduce the asymmetric information occurs. The less asymmetric
information occurs in the financial institutions, the less level of underpricing happened. These results support our
expectation on hypothesis 2a.
Table 2. ONE SAMPLE T-TEST ON AVERAGE INITIAL RETURN
Financial Institutions (N=29)











1 0.1254 3.6215*** 0.2131 5.3079*** 0.0435 0.9180 0.2834 10.6533***
2 0.0014 0.0785 0.0069 0.1947 -0.0037 -0.2702 -0.0052 -0.5291
3 0.0038 0.3 167 0.0043 0.1960 0.0034 0.2781 0.0068 0.7574
4 0.0036 0.3468 -0.0104 -0.6947 0.0166 1.1840 -0.0055 -0.9958
5 0.0013 0.1360 -0.0023 -0.1332 0.0046 0.5017 0.0183 2.8724*
6 -0.0102 -1.1809 0.0038 0.6733 -0.0232 -1.5173 0.0057 0.7673
7 0.0010 0.1387 -0.0020 -0.2351 0.0038 0.3105 -0.0024 -0.4403
8 -0.0025 -0.4410 -0.0064 -0.8194 0.0011 0.1284 0.0040 0.7911
9 -0.0027 -0.3 196 -0.0004 -0.0725 -0.0049 -0.3084 -0.0026 -0.6594
10 -0.0049 -0.7166 0.0046 0.5715 -0.0137 -1.3049 0.0003 0.0531
11 0.0115 1.3731 0.0074 0.5015 0.0153 1.7020 0.0057 1.2233
12 0.0021 0.2114 -0.0016 -0.0835 0.0056 0.9477 0.0120 2.1098**
13 0.0058 0.9951 0.0033 0.4488 0.0082 0.8884 0.0078 1.8899**
14 -0.0072 -1.0293 -0.0073 -0.5400 -0.0071 -1.2863 0.0107 2.2371**
15 0.0043 0.6686 0.0036 0.3130 0.0050 0.7291 0.0118 2.2057**
16 0.0024 0.2941 -0.0092 -0.6943 0.0131 1.4728 -0.0055 -1.0518
17 -0.0061 -0.6901 -0.0094 -0.5899 -0.0030 -0.3362 0.0057 0.9883
18 0.0103 1.0649 -0.0065 -0.6214 0.0261 1.7122 0.0000 -0.0019
19 0.0036 0.4945 0.0147 1.5011 -0.0068 -0.6802 0.0059 1.3983
20 -0.0012 -0.2246 -0.0059 -1.2456 0.0032 0.3604 0.0013 0.3354
Total 0.1416 0.2001 0.0871 0.3583
Description:
*significant at α=10%
** significant at α=5%
*** significant at α=1%
Sources: Indonesian Stock Exchange and Financial Laboratory Database FBE UBAYA
Abnormal return calculation results shows that there is not much differences between calculations of initial
return and abnormal return, except the significance of non-bank financial institutions. Table 3 shows that the
values of abnormal return for financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions during the first 20 trading
days in IDX. Consistent with the previous table, Table 3 gave insignificant result on the first day trading for
non-bank financial institution, but on the 18th day of trade in BEI. This shows that the use of abnormal returns as
a measurement to identify underpricing is better than the initial return, although only occurs in only 1 day's
trading. Despite of these differences, other results are consistent with test results in table 2 thus support
thehypothesis 1b. Furthermore, the test results in table 2 and table 3 are generally accepting hypothesis 1. In
addition to accepting the hypothesis 1, the results of table 3 which indicates that the entity's financial
sector experienced a smaller underpricing than corporate non-financial sector also supports the acceptance
hypothesis 2b.
7Table 3. ONE SAMPLE T-TEST ON AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN
Financial Institutions (N=29)










t value Return t value
1 0.1245 3.6332*** 0.2107 5.3605*** 0.0441 0.9301 0.2827 10.6597***
2 0.0025 0.1366 0.0052 0.1477 -0.0001 -0.0059 -0.0076 -0.7525
3 0.0034 0.2784 0.0098 0.4451 -0.0026 -0.2181 0.0069 0.7783
4 -0.0005 -0.0467 -0.0107 -0.7341 0.0091 0.6675 -0.0068 -1.2547
5 -0.0018 -0.1796 -0.0026 -0.1356 -0.0011 -0.1231 0.0155 2.3954**
6 -0.0090 -0.9568 0.0088 1.2344 -0.0257 -1.5988 0.0076 0.9921
7 -0.0035 -0.4980 -0.0074 -0.8407 0.0001 0.0078 -0.0040 -0.7609
8 0.0003 0.0601 0.0009 0.1276 -0.0002 -0.0269 0.0026 0.5262
9 -0.0007 -0.0786 0.0038 0.5134 -0.0048 -0.3261 -0.0021 -0 .5535
10 -0.0061 -0.8784 0.0042 0.4735 -0.0157 -1.5389 -0.0006 -0.1050
11 0.0049 0.5605 -0.0003 -0.0191 0.0097 1.0436 0.0007 0.1537
12 -0.0028 -0.2651 -0.0063 -0.2996 0.0004 0.0640 0.0095 1.7534*
13 0.0050 0.8525 0.0027 0.3285 0.0072 0.8253 0.0088 2.1648**
14 -0.0041 -0.5468 -0.0033 -0.2260 -0.0048 -0.8383 0.0107 2.2165**
15 0.0073 1.1429 0.0083 0.7980 0.0063 0.7976 0.0109 2.1858**
16 0.0016 0.2238 -0.0117 -1.1153 0.0141 1.5777 -0.0059 -1.1705
17 -0.0038 -0.4439 -0.0094 -0.6232 0.0014 0.1626 0.0079 1.4072
18 0.0077 0.8111 -0.0118 -1.1213 0.0258 1.8215* 0.0015 0.2773
19 0.0017 0.2360 0.0082 0.8560 -0.0043 -0.3878 0.0036 0.8199
20 0.0029 0.4541 -0.0049 -0.9884 0.0101 0.9074 0.0011 0.2721
Total 0.1296 0.1944 0.0691 0.3429
Description:
*significant at α=10%
** significant at α=5%
*** significant at α=1%
Sources: Indonesian Stock Exchange and Financial Laboratory Database FBE UBAYA,
The test of ex-ante uncertainty differences is shown in Table 4. These results show no significant values in all
panels. The insignificant results reject hypothesis 3a and 3b. Thus, allegations that have been proposed in
hypothesis 3 rejected.




SD-IR 0.04022 0.04485 -0.7997
SD-AR 0.04147 0.04457 -0.5591
1/GP 2.70928E-11 3.50266E-11 -0.6887
YOP 25.250 16.367 2.3097**
Panel B Average t value
Bank Non- financial
SD-IR 0.04401 0.04485 -0.0954
SD-AR 0.04577 0.04457 0.1429
1/GP 1.97326E-11 3.50266E-11 -1.2596
YOP 36.571 16.367 4.1005***
Panel C Average t value
Non-bank Non- financial
SD-IR 0.03669 0.04485 -1.2378
SD-AR 0.03745 0.04457 -1.1284
1/GP 3.39624E-11 3.50266E-11 -0.0894
YOP 13.929 16.367 -0.9826
Panel D Average t value
8Non-bank Bank
SD-IR 0.03669 0.04401 -0.7137
SD-AR 0.03745 0.04577 -0.8628
1/GP 3.39624E-11 1.97326E-11 1.9655
YOP 13.929 36.571 -2.9038**
Description:
*significant at α=10% ** significant at α=5% ***
significant at α=1%
Table 5 shows the average value of initial return and the level of significance in each comparison group. In the
comparison between financial institutions and nonfinancial institutions, t test results showed that the initial returns
of the financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions. These results support the t test results in table 2
thus accept the hypothesis 2a. Financial institutions have less asymmetric information than non-financial institutions.
This shows that the regulator has managed to reduce the information asymmetry that occurred after the economic
crisis in the period 1997-1998. Through tight supervision and better information disclosure, the public can obtain
better information about the condition of the financial institutions that have an impact on the less underpricing
occurs when enterprises are going public.
Table 5. T TEST DIFFERENCES ON INITIAL RETURN AVERAGES
Population Non- Financial (28,34%) Bank (21,31%)
Financial (12,54%) -3.2449*** -
Bank (21,31%) -1.0723*** -
Non-Bank (4,35%) -3.7167** -2.7307
Description:
Figures in brackets indicate initial return for each group
Figures in the table shows the statistical t value for the null hypothesis that there is no difference in average
initial return for the sample pairs
*significant at a=10%
** significant at a=5%
*** significant at a=1%
Another comparison between banks and non-financial institutions results that initial returns of banks are less than
non-financial institutions. Comparison between non-bank financial institutions and non-financial institutions also
provides the results that initial return of non-bank financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions.
These results are consistent with research Alli et al (1994) whose found similar results in their research. Meanwhile,
we found insignificant result in comparison between banks and non-banks financial institutions. The results are
not significant because of initial return values are not very different.
Table 6. T TEST DIFFERENCES ON ABNORMAL RETURN AVERAGES
Population Non-Financial (28,27%) Bank (21,07%)
Financial (12,45%) -3.2615***
Bank (21,07%) -1.1018*** -
Non-Bank (4,41%) -3.7071** -2.7069
Description:
Figures in brackets indicate initial return for each group
Figures in the table shows the statistical t value for the null hypothesis that there is no difference in average abnormal
return for the sample pairs
*significant at a=10%
** significant at a=5%
*** significant at a=1%
Consistent with previous table, Table 6 shows significant results in three types of comparisons. The comparison is
between the financial institutions and non-financial institutions; banks and non-financial institutions; and between
non-bank financial institutions and non-financial institutions. These results support the t test results in table 3 thus
9accept hypothesis 2b. These results generally accept hypothesis 2. The other comparisons also provide results that
are consistent with the previous table. The results of comparison showed that there was no significant difference
between the use of initial returns and abnormal returns to measure the level of significance of the first day return.
Table 7. REGRESSION TEST ON INITIAL RETURN
Panel A: Financial vs Non- Financial (n = 104)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
0.19445 -0.16220 -0.03673 2.61030 -0.00036 0.1854 6.8611
(3.91571)*** (-3.41830)*** (-0.17211) (3.33832)*** (-0.30476) (0.00007)***
Panel B: Bank vs Non- Financial (n = 93)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
0.19197 -0.04933 -0.14076 2.65800 -0.00108 0.0833 3.0896
(3.51 182)*** (-0.71870) (-0.61514) (3.07172)*** (-0.80746) (0.01978)**
Panel C: Non-Bank vs Non- Financial (n = 94)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
0.21444 -0.23115 -0.12503 2.34868 -0.00167 0.1700 5.7610
(3.4965 1)*** (-3.57539)*** (-0.51922) (2.52429)** (-0.94012) (0.00036)***
Panel D: Bank vs Non-Bank (n = 29)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
-0.01868 0.14232 0.63015 1.37549 -0.00007 0.1864 2.6035
(-0.28983) (1.9551 8)* (1.40400) (1.14299) (-0.04524) (0.12945)
Description:
IRI, t = initial return i stock t period
D = dummy variable for different types of firms; with one for the financial institutions and zero for non-financial
institutions (A), one for banks and zero for non-financial institutions (B), one for non- bank financial institutions
and zero for non-financial sector (C), and one for banks and zero for non- banks financial institutions (D)
RU = ratio underwriter reputation ranking
SD = standard deviation of initial returns from the second day the stock traded up to twenty days YOP= number of
years from firms was established until first emission of shares
*significant at α=10%
** significant at α=5%
*** significant at α=1%
Regression test results in table 7 provide different significances results in each panel. Significant value to the
variable types of firms indicates that there is an initial return difference between the financial institutions and
non-financial institutions. Negative value coefficient on variable explained that initial returns on financial
institutions are smaller than non-financial institutions. These results are consistent with the results of t test on
the previous table that the initial return of financial institutions are less than non-financial institutions. This further
supports the truth of statement that asymmetric information differences occurred between the financial institutions and
nonfinancial institutions as proposed in hypothesis 2. People tend to have more complete information about financial
institutions than non-financial institutions.
The other variable that shows significant results is standard deviation. Significant value on the standard
deviation of variables explained that the volatility of stock prices affect initial return. The positive coefficient
value of standard deviation shows that the larger the standard deviation, the more underpriced the IPO (as
measured using the initial return). These results are consistent with the statement that standard deviation has
positive effect on underpricing (Ritter, 1984; Alli et al, 1994). These results explain that the standard deviation
affect the underpricing of all institutions. Despite of it’s effect on underpricing of IPO, there is no differences in
value of standard deviation between financial institutions and non-financial institutions. Thus, the results of
regression on the standard deviation of these variables accept hypothesis 4a.
Variables that insignificant are the age of firms and underwriter reputation. Possible explanation about this
insignificant value is because of incomplete information about the company whose want to do IPO, so this
variable does not affect the level of underpricing. Based on the results is not significant, the hypothesis 5a is
rejected. Underwriter reputation variable contains negative value on it’s coefficients. Possible explanation
about this insignificant value because the difference of information (asymmetric information) occurred by each
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investors. This conditions force them to make investment decisions without considering reputation of
underwriter factor. This insignificant result rejects hypothesis 6a.
Table 8. REGRESSION TEST ON ABNORMAL RETURN
Panel A: Financial vs Non- Financial (n = 102)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
0.20810 -0.16914 -0.01764 2.40485 -0.00038 0.1858 6.7617
(4. 13569)* (-3.56957)*** (-0.08169) (3.05757)*** (-0.32376) (0.00008)***
Panel B: Bank vs Non- Financial (n = 93)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
0.18427 -0.05922 -0.11270 2.72521 -0.00091 0.0867 3.1821
(3.32584)*** (-0.86773) (-0.49268) (3. 12864)*** (-0.68624) (0.0172)**
Panel C: Non-Bank vs Non- Financial (n = 94)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
0.20709 -0.23030 -0.10336 2.45735 -0.00162 0.1754 5.9443
(3.35280)*** (-3.58801)*** (-0.43022) (2.64102)*** (-0.91377) (0.0003)***
Panel D: Bank vs Non-Bank (n = 29)
Constanta D RU SD YOP Adj R Square F Test
-0.02141 0.13399 0.61253 1.36864 0.00013 0.1752 2.4870
(-0.31925) (1 .84134)* (1.36508) (1.07080) (0.08622) (0.14307)
Description:
ARI, t = abnormal return i stock t period
D = dummy variable for different types of firms; with one for the financial institutions and zero for non-financial
institutions (A), one for banks and zero for non-financial institutions (B), one for
non- bank financial institutions and zero for non-financial sector (C), and one for banks and zero
for non- banks financial institutions (D) RU = ratio
underwriter reputation ranking
SD = standard deviation of initial returns from the second
day the stock traded up to twenty days YOP= number of
years from firms was established until first emission of
shares
*significant at α=10%
** significant at α=5%
*** significant at α=1%
In regression testing with an abnormal return as the dependent variable are presented in Table 8 gives results that
are consistent with previous regression testing. Panel A shows significant results on coefficients of variables, types
of business entities, and the standard deviation. In the variable types of business entities, the value of the coefficient is
negative and significantly explained that the initial return on the financial sector enterprises is smaller than a
business enterprise of non-financial sector. These results also support the statement about the information
asymmetry differences between the financial sector enterprises and non-financial sector as proposed in hypothesis
2.
Standard deviation positive coefficient values and significant indicates that the standard deviation positively related
with abnormal return. These results indicate that both the use of initial return and abnormal return as
dependent variables results significant standard deviation values. Standard deviations affect the level of
underpricing, but did not show any differences in it’s value between financial institutions and nonfinancial
institutions. Based on these results, the hypothesis 4b accepted. With the acceptance of hypotheses 4a and 4b, we
accept hypothesis 4.
Despite of significant variables, there are insignificant variables too. These insignificant variables are age of firms and
underwriter reputation. These results reject the hypothesis 5b and also reject hypothesis 5 too. Results of the
underwriter reputation variable coefficients also showed a negative value too. Therefore, these results reject the
hypothesis 6b and also reject hypothesis 6.
V. Conclusion
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The results showed that one, during 2001-2008 period, there was a significant underpricing of IPOs. The financial
institutions IPO’s were less underpriced non-financial institutions. This shows that there is asymmetric information
difference between the financial institutions and non-financial institutions. Supervision for financial institutions has
developed better than the previous few years. Second, there are several factors that affect underpricing significantly.
These factors are type of firms and stock trading price volatility in stock exchange.
Third, there is no significant difference in the use of abnormal returns or initial return as a measurement of
underpricing of IPO. We found that there is one significance more on abnormal return better than initial return. There
is a possibility that the use of market return JCI (km) as a proxy of expected return is less able to give better results
than the use of initial return. So that the results in almost all tests showed the similarity in the amount of
significance, except on one sample t-test. In this case, both the use of initial return and abnormal return are both
good. Fourth, the use of data open to close prices could provide more accurate results for calculation of initial
returns and abnormal returns to determine the level of underpricing of IPO.
Based on the results of this study, we recommend investors to consider the types of firms as consideration for
investment decision. This is important because investors need to reduce the uncertainty their faces. Investors need
to be cautious in investing in stocks that have high underpricing, because there is a greater risk waiting ahead than
the stocks with lower underpricing.
Bapepam as expected from the capital market regulators in Indonesia can implement the new rules that could reduce
public ignorance about the reputation of the underwriters and firms age. These things can be a public expose more
complete on the m e d i a , a l l o w i n g t h e p u b l i c t o h a v e m o r e c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . As an
important party in the process of initial public offering (IPO), the underwriters need to make a full public exposure in
order to give enough information to the public. It is expected that through the full public exposure can reduce the
asymmetric information occurs, especially for non-financial institutions. The less asymmetric information occurs, the
less level of underpricing occurs too. This will maximize the firms funds need for the purpose of financing its operation
activities.
For further research, we recommend continue using the open to close prices in order to get unbiased results in the
calculation to measure the level of underpricing. In addition, when using the abnormal return as a measurement, we
recommend to use other models other than market adjusted models in order to get more accurate result and prove that
this measurement do better to calculate underpricing than initial return. Researchers can also add further factors
affecting underpricing such as type of investors.
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